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OWNING PROPERTY WITHOUT PRIVACY: 
HOW LAVAN v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 
OFFERS INCREASED FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION TO SKID ROW’S HOMELESS 
Benjamin G. Kassis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2011, Tony Lavan and seven other Los Angeles 
Skid Row residents became fed up.1 It had been only a few weeks 
since their personal belongings were seized and destroyed by Los 
Angeles city officials, and sensing that their constitutional rights had 
been infringed, they sought legal counsel. Thereafter Lavan and his 
seven coplaintiffs (“Plaintiffs”) filed a purported class action against 
the city of Los Angeles (the “City”), alleging that City officials had 
violated their individual rights by disregarding the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, among other constitutional 
provisions.2 
By the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit, a significant 
constitutional question had surfaced: Does the Fourth Amendment 
protect an indigent individual’s unattended personal belongings from 
unreasonable seizure?3 The court, in a 2–1 decision, answered in the 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Communication 
Studies, Loyola Marymount University, May, 2010. 
 1. Skid Row is located in downtown Los Angeles, California, and contains the largest 
concentration of homeless persons in the city. L.A. HOMELESS SERVS. AUTH., 2011 GREATER 
LOS ANGELES HOMELESS COUNT REPORT 37 (2011), available at http://www.lahsa.org/docs 
/2011-Homeless-Count/HC11-Detailed-Geography-Report-FINAL.PDF; see also L.A. 
HOMELESS SERVS. AUTH., 2009 GREATER LOS ANGELES HOMELESS COUNT REPORT 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.lahsa.org/docs/HC09/SKID_ROW_Jan13_10.pdf (detailing Skid Row 
homeless population statistics). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); Lavan v. City of Los 
Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 3. See Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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affirmative.4 
The conclusion reached by the majority of the court is of 
particular importance to members of homeless communities located 
in the Ninth Circuit. Because such individuals have no homes in 
which to store their personal property, questions of ownership, 
privacy, and property rights are difficult to settle. Perhaps more so 
than anything, belongings located within the sturdy confines of the 
home suggest ownership and privacy expectations, while those left 
on the sidewalk are surely open to ambiguity and dispute. 
Accordingly, homeless individuals’ personal property, often left on 
sidewalks and in other public areas, will likely come into direct 
conflict with a city’s efforts to remove seemingly unowned property 
and to maintain clean and unsoiled streets.5 The court confronted this 
conflict in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.6 
Part II of this Comment discusses the factual background of the 
case, while Part III sets forth the court’s reasoning in concluding that 
the Fourth Amendment extends to Plaintiffs’ belongings. Part IV 
examines that reasoning in the context of past and current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and includes a discussion of the opinion’s 
legal and practical significance in the Ninth Circuit. Part V concludes 
that Lavan’s explicit shift away from a strictly privacy-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment offers an extra layer of 
constitutional protection to homeless individuals’ property. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As is common practice of many individuals living in Skid Row, 
Plaintiffs had made a habit of storing their personal belongings in a 
variety of “mobile shelters.”7 Nonprofit organizations throughout 
Skid Row provided such shelters to Plaintiffs, usually in the form of 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 1025; see also, e.g., Alexandra Zavis, Major Cleanup of L.A. Skid Row, 
Prompted by Health Report, Begins, L.A. TIMES (June 20, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012 
/jun/20/local/la-me-skid-row-cleanup-20120620 (reporting on personal property seizures on Skid 
Row). 
 6. 693 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). Though the Lavan court also examined and resolved 
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim, its holding as to the Fourth Amendment demonstrates 
the legal shift at which this Comment is directed. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Ninth Circuit held that Plaintiffs’ personal belongings constitute protectable “property.” Id. at 
1031–33. 
 7. Id. at 1025. 
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either carts or apparatuses known as EDARs.8 Plaintiffs, like many 
others, kept numerous important possessions in these tiny shelters, 
including identification documents, family memorabilia, and various 
medications.9 
On numerous occasions between February and March 2011, 
Plaintiffs temporarily left their shelters unattended on the City’s 
public sidewalks to “perform necessary tasks[,] such as showering, 
eating, using restrooms, or attending court.”10 During these brief 
periods, City officials, though notified that the property was not 
abandoned,11 took and subsequently “trashed” Plaintiffs’ carts and 
EDARs.12 The City never provided Plaintiffs the opportunity to 
retrieve their personal belongings before destroying them.13 
In support of its actions, the City argued that the seizure and 
destruction14 of Plaintiffs’ personal belongings had been authorized 
by local statute and that Plaintiffs had been given notice of the same. 
Specifically, the City pointed to Los Angeles Municipal Code section 
56.11, which provides that “[n]o person shall leave or permit to 
remain any merchandise, baggage[,] or any article of personal 
property upon any parkway or sidewalk.”15 In addition, the City had 
posted approximately seventy-three signs throughout Skid Row, 
warning residents that there would be regular street clean-ups 
between certain hours.16 
 
 8. Id. at 1025 n.4 (“EDARs are small, collapsible mobile shelters provided to homeless 
persons by Everyone Deserves a Roof, a nonprofit organization.”). 
 9. Id. at 1025. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (“The city did not have a good-faith belief that [Plaintiffs’] possessions were 
abandoned when it destroyed them. Indeed, . . . [bystanders] explained to City employees that the 
property was not abandoned, and implored the City not to destroy it.”). Though subtle, this fact 
was crucial to Lavan’s holding. It suggests that Plaintiffs’ mobile shelters would not have come 
within the Fourth Amendment’s scope had city officials maintained a “good-faith” belief that the 
shelters were abandoned. 
 12. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 693 
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 13. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1026–27. 
 14. Id. at 1025 (observing that the City seized and immediately destroyed Plaintiffs’ 
belongings). 
 15. L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 56.11 (1963), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt 
/gateway.dll/California/lamc/municipalcode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:los 
angeles_ca_mc. 
 16. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1033–34 (Callahan, J., dissenting). The signs read as follows:  
Please take notice that Los Angeles Municipal Code § 56.11 prohibits 
leaving any merchandise, baggage or personal property on a public 
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Seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against the 
City’s practices, Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against the 
City in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.17 
Among other things, Plaintiffs alleged that the City’s practice of 
seizing and destroying their personal property was unreasonable and 
thus violated their Fourth Amendment rights.18 
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction, finding that they had established a likelihood of success 
on the merits of their constitutional claim. In particular, Plaintiffs had 
shown that the City’s seizure and swift destruction of their mobile 
shelters was likely unreasonable, thereby violating the Fourth 
Amendment.19 
The City appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously 
applied the Fourth Amendment to Plaintiffs’ unattended shelters 
despite the fact that Plaintiffs’ lack of any privacy interest in those 
shelters should have precluded such protection.20 In other words, the 
City contended that Plaintiffs could not have established a likelihood 
of success on the merits because their mobile shelters did not come 
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection.21 In a 2–1 
decision, the Ninth Circuit disagreed.22 
III.  THE REASONING OF THE COURT 
On appeal, the City drew upon the Fourth Amendment standard 
established in Katz v. United States23 and argued that Plaintiffs did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their unattended 
shelters.24 The City argued that, under Katz, this absence of privacy 
 
sidewalk. The City of Los Angeles has a regular clean-up of this area 
scheduled for Monday through Friday between 8:00 and 11:00 am. Any 
property left at or near this location at the time of this clean-up is subject to 
disposal by the City of Los Angeles. 
Id. 
 17. Lavan, 797 F. Supp. 2d. at 1009. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1016. 
 20. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027. 
 21. Id. (“The City’s only argument on appeal is that its seizure and destruction of 
[Plaintiffs’] unabandoned property [does not] implicate[] . . . the Fourth . . . Amendment.”). 
 22. Id. at 1027–33. 
 23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 24. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027. 
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expectations precluded the Fourth Amendment’s protection.25 
The Lavan court began its opinion by introducing the Search and 
Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment and ultimately held that its 
protections do extend to Plaintiffs’ mobile shelters left unattended on 
the City sidewalks.26 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
distinguished the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable searches from its protection against unreasonable 
seizures.27 Citing to United States v. Jacobsen,28 the court initially 
observed that a search is a governmental intrusion “upon an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider 
reasonable,” while a seizure is a government action that causes 
“meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in 
[his] property.”29 Once a court determines that a government action 
constitutes a search or seizure, it then must determine whether the 
search or seizure was reasonable.30 
Based on the distinction set forth in Jacobsen, the court 
determined that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not required to 
show a Fourth Amendment violation arising out of a seizure, which 
occurred here.31 To further support its reasoning, the court cited the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in United States v. Jones32 and Soldal v. 
Cook County.33 Collectively, these holdings suggest that “a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is not required for Fourth 
Amendment protections to apply.”34 Essentially, by way of the above 
 
 25. Id.; see also id. at 1035–39 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause the district court 
misapprehended the law, its ruling should be vacated” since “‘[a] district court’s decision is based 
on an erroneous legal standard if: (1) the court did not employ the appropriate legal standards that 
govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction; or (2) in applying the appropriate legal standards, 
the court misapprehends the law with respect to the underlying issues in the litigation.’” (quoting 
Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 730 (9th Cir. 1999))). 
 26. Id. at 1030 (majority opinion). 
 27. Id. at 1027. 
 28. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 29. Lavan, 693 F. 3d at 1027 (citing Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113). 
 30. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1030. 
 31. Id. (“[B]y seizing and destroying [Plaintiffs’] unabandoned [belongings], the City 
meaningfully interfered with [Plaintiffs’] possessory interests in that property.”). 
 32. 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (holding that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall 
with the Katz formulation”). 
 33. 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (noting that the Katz emphasis on privacy has not “snuffed out 
the previously recognized protection for property under the Fourth Amendment”); see also 
Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027–28 (“Appellees need not show a reasonable expectation of privacy to 
enjoy the protection of the Fourth Amendment against seizures of their unabandoned property.”). 
 34. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028. 
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three opinions, the court held that Plaintiffs were able to seek 
protection of their belongings against unreasonable seizure 
regardless of whether they maintained a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in them.35 Accordingly, nothing more than “some 
meaningful interference” with an individual’s property is required to 
trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
government seizure.36 To this end, Plaintiffs’ shelters, though 
unattended to and left in public view, constitute protectable property 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
Having established that the district court had applied a proper 
Fourth Amendment legal standard, the Ninth Circuit concluded its 
analysis by affirming the district court’s discretionary findings—that 
(1) the City did interfere with Plaintiffs’ possessory interests in their 
property by seizing Plaintiffs’ mobile shelters, and (2) the City’s 
seizure and immediate destruction of the shelters were likely to be 
found unreasonable.37 
IV.  ANALYSIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ADOPTION 
AND EXPANSION OF EMERGING 
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRECEDENT 
In sum, Lavan v. City of Los Angeles held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects against unreasonable government seizures 
notwithstanding any objective privacy interest.38 Such a holding 
appears unremarkable enough. In fact, the court’s ultimate finding in 
Lavan seems to be no more than a logical extension of the Fourth 
Amendment precedent established in Jacobsen, Jones, and Soldal.39 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1027, 1030. 
 37. Id. at 1030–31. As to the City’s argument regarding Plaintiffs’ violation of the municipal 
code, the court reasoned:  
[e]ven if we were to assume, as the City maintains, that Appellees violated 
LAMC § 56.11 . . . the seizure and destruction of [their] property remains 
subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Violation 
of a City ordinance does not vitiate the Fourth Amendment’s protection of 
one’s property. Were it otherwise, the government could seize and destroy 
any illegally parked car or unlawfully unattended dog without implicating 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 1029. 
 38. Id. at 1027–28. 
 39. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 
(1992); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); see also Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028. 
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Lavan, however, represents more than a mere application of facts to 
judicial precedent. Rather, it solidifies an expansion of Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures and endorses a 
significant move away from the Katz privacy-based scheme of the 
last several decades.40 In order to fully explore the opinion, this 
Comment examines pre- and post-Katz Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Lavan court’s outright endorsement of a shift 
away from Katz, and the particular impact that the opinion has on 
homeless communities located within the Ninth Circuit. 
A.  The Mid-Twentieth Century Emphasis Shift from 
Property Rights to Privacy Interests 
Until the latter half of the 1900s, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence protected against trespass to property, not persons.41 In 
order for a policeman to conduct an informational search in pre-1900 
America, for instance, he would have to do so by physically 
intruding upon a private setting and placing himself within earshot of 
an otherwise confidential conversation.42 However, the advent of 
“remote surveillance [and other] communication devices” created a 
less physically intrusive means by which government officials could 
glean information from potential wrongdoers, and the property-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment became problematic.43 Naturally, 
these newfound deficiencies inherent in the strictly property-based 
approach necessitated a more modernized constitutional doctrine, 
one with an eye toward the person.44 In 1967 this tension led the 
 
 40. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1027–31; see also Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two 
Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 119, 120 (2002) (observing that Katz “[u]sher[ed] in modern Fourth Amendment doctrine”). 
 41. Will Stancil, Warrantless Search Cases Are Really All the Same, 97 MINN. L. REV. 337, 
340 (2012). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id.; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that “the 
search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his papers, or his effects”). But see Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding that “the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . 
[have] been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated 
can no longer be regarded as controlling”). 
 44. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1517–18 
(2010). Solove observes that the Court’s initial approach was to “focus on physical types of 
intrusions.” Id. at 1517. However, “technology changed everything. Developed in the late 
nineteenth century, telephone communication—and the ability to wiretap telephone 
conversations—posed new and challenging Fourth Amendment questions.” Id. at 1518. 
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Supreme Court to consider Katz v. United States.45 
Katz shifted the Fourth Amendment’s focus from trespass to 
property to the individual’s interest in and expectation of his or her 
privacy. “[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” 
repeated Justice John Marshall Harlan II, not more than a handful of 
words before establishing what would become the modern bedrock 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the Katz test.46 The test is two-
fold, requiring that in order to challenge government action under the 
Fourth Amendment, a complainant must show “first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”47 In Katz, the government action at issue 
was a search rather than a seizure, but the emphasis on privacy that 
Katz established would, for decades, become the polestar of the 
Search and Seizure Clause in its entirety.48 However, two recent 
Supreme Court opinions created the opportunity for yet another 
Fourth Amendment shift, both of which became the basis for the 
holding in Lavan v. City of Los Angeles.49 
B.  The Inevitable Dissolution of Privacy Interests As a 
Fourth Amendment Precondition 
In 2012 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. 
 
 45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 46. Id. at 361; see also Colb, supra note 40 (explaining how Katz established the Court’s 
current approach to Fourth Amendment applicability); Solove, supra note 44, at 1518–19 (same). 
 47. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 48. Id. at 356; see also, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177–78 (1984) (“Since 
Katz v. United States, the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question 
whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 
U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (finding that “a ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful 
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property,” but further observing that 
the government action was reasonable because the complainant’s “privacy interest in the [item 
seized] had been largely compromised” and thus “could no longer support an expectation of 
privacy” (emphasis added)); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978) (holding that the 
complainants were unable to seek Fourth Amendment protection “since they made no showing 
that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy” in the area searched or the items seized); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–42 (1976) (holding that bank records seized by 
government officials were not protected under the Fourth Amendment because no legitimate 
expectation of privacy existed in them). 
 49. See generally Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 1027–30 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining how the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Jones and Soldal expanded Fourth 
Amendment protection beyond privacy expectations). 
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Jones and held that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not 
required to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protection.50 There, the 
Court held that surveillance equipment attached to the underbody of 
a car constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, not because 
the owner had had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information obtained through the surveillance equipment, but 
because the government physically had trespassed on the individual’s 
personal property.51 In so holding, the Court both scrutinized the 
Katz test and attempted to clarify its limits.52 Specifically, the Court 
stated that “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the 
Katz formulation” and that Katz “did not narrow the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.”53 Though not attempting to replace the Katz 
test itself, the Court nevertheless invited Lavan-like opinions into 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by placing an explicit emphasis on 
property, not privacy.54 In doing so, the Court referenced the second 
case crucial to Lavan’s reasoning: Soldal v. Cook County.55 
Jones relied heavily on the Soldal opinion to scrutinize and 
demarcate the Katz test’s breadth.56 In Soldal, the Court held that the 
forcible removal of a trailer home triggered the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections, even though the state officials effecting the removal did 
not “invade the [complainant’s] privacy.”57 According to Soldal, the 
Katz test established that “property rights are not the sole measure of 
Fourth Amendment violations,” but Katz did not “snuf[f] out the 
previously recognized protection for property.”58 Though not 
purporting to alter the Katz test itself, Soldal undoubtedly illuminated 
it, suggesting that Katz is but one way in which a person might assert 
protection under the Fourth Amendment.59 Jones simply followed 
suit, and the two opinions provided the Lavan majority with enough 
 
 50. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012). 
 51. Id. at 949. 
 52. See id. at 950–53; see also Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1028 (explaining how Jones “reiterated 
that a reasonable expectation of privacy is not required for Fourth Amendment protections to 
apply” because Fourth Amendment rights do not turn exclusively on the Katz test). 
 53. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51. 
 54. Id. at 949 (referring to the “significance of property rights in search-and-seizure 
analysis”). 
 55. Id. at 951. 
 56. See id. 
 57. 506 U.S. 56, 60–62 (1992). 
 58. Id. at 64. 
 59. See id. 
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judicial strength to support its primary holding—that some 
meaningful interference with one’s property, regardless of any 
privacy expectation, is wholly sufficient not only to challenge a 
government seizure but to do so successfully.60 
C.  The Legal and Practical Significance 
of Lavan in the Ninth Circuit 
As noted above, Lavan v. City of Los Angeles represents a 
significant endorsement of non-privacy-based Fourth Amendment 
law in the Ninth Circuit, and advances the property-based approach 
reintroduced by Soldal, and plainly set forth in Jones.61 Doubtless, 
the outcome of a Fourth Amendment challenge to government 
seizure is no longer contingent on any “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” at all. In the Ninth Circuit, the former requirement is 
sufficient to trigger the Amendment’s protection against seizure of 
unabandoned property, but it is no longer necessary—this is Lavan’s 
bottom line.62 
While the facts in Lavan required the court to consider the 
Fourth Amendment primarily in the context of government 
seizures,63 the court reached its conclusion only after acknowledging 
the limited reach of Katz with respect to the Search and Seizure 
Clause as a whole.64 As mentioned above, the court’s open 
endorsement in dicta of a property-based, “irrespective of privacy” 
approach to the search context suggests that the court’s holding 
would not have changed had Los Angeles city officials merely 
searched Plaintiffs’ belongings.65 The City officials’ theoretical 
search of such belongings still would thus have triggered the Fourth 
 
 60. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951; see also Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, 693 F.3d 1022, 
1027–28 (9th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the Fourth Amendment protects against meaningful 
interference with one’s property even when there is no reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 61. As referenced above, Lavan was a split decision. The dissent, rather vehemently, 
contended that an expectation of privacy was required for Lavan and his co-plaintiffs to have 
Fourth Amendment standing, a common prerequisite under Ninth Circuit precedent prior to 
Lavan. See Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1035–39 (Callahan, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., United States v. 
SDI Future Health, Inc., 568 F.3d 684, 694–95 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o say that a party lacks 
[F]ourth [A]mendment standing is to say that his reasonable expectation of privacy has not been 
infringed.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 62. Lavan, 693 F.3d at 1030 (majority opinion). 
 63. See id. at 1023–27. 
 64. Id. at 1027–30. 
 65. Id. at 1029. 
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Amendment, even if Plaintiffs maintained absolutely no expectation 
of privacy in them.66 
As a result of Lavan, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit have gained 
an alternative method through which to vindicate their constitutional 
rights, and need not stake their Fourth Amendment claims—search 
or seizure—on a reasonable expectation of privacy.67 This 
developing approach to Fourth Amendment standing is of particular 
value when considering its protection of indigent individuals’ 
property. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a societal faction in the 
Ninth Circuit more significantly affected by Lavan than its homeless 
communities, the largest among them being Los Angeles’s Skid 
Row.68 
The property-based Fourth Amendment standard set forth in 
Lavan undoubtedly provides Skid Row’s homeless an extra layer of 
constitutional protection. For certain, indigent communities often 
lack the walls and borders that protect personal property, and such 
hard boundaries also suggest that the owner has in her property an 
expectation of privacy, both actual and reasonable.69 Those living 
about the sidewalks and street corners of Skid Row do not maintain 
similar fortunes, as their belongings are perpetually left within the 
reach and view of the public. Tony Lavan himself echoed this 
sentiment. Seeing a Los Angeles police officer order unattended 
belongings off of a city sidewalk, Lavan hollered to a nearby 
reporter, “‘What are we supposed to do? Where do they want us to 
go?’ . . . ‘We live here!’”70 
Thus, it is not surprising that an indigent plaintiff, like Tony 
Lavan, might confront considerable difficulty in establishing an 
expectation of privacy in his or her belongings—homeless 
individuals do not have much of it, and it is simply unrealistic to 
suppose otherwise. Ask any one of them, and he or she will tell you: 
privacy isn’t free. Those able to afford it may not find difficulty 
establishing an objective expectation of privacy in their belongings, 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2006) (“Skid Row has the highest 
concentration of homeless individuals in the United States.”). 
 69. See Sandy Banks, Mission Hopes a Fee Will Change Skid Row’s Culture, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2011, at A2. 
 70. Id. 
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but there are many who cannot.71 This is one of the practical, real-
world effects of Lavan: it offers protection to the legitimate 
belongings of those who do not live in privacy, those who are not 
accustomed to it, and those who will likely not come to expect it. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A little over forty-five years ago, Justice Harlan endorsed a 
seemingly simple idea: the “Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”72 At the time, the words were used to preface the privacy-
based test that his concurrence in Katz would establish, but that 
Lavan would decline to apply decades later. However, and perhaps 
ironically, Lavan’s reinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment, albeit 
guided by Jones and Soldal, has only reinforced the spirit of that 
statement. By extending the Fourth Amendment’s reach far beyond 
mere interests in privacy, the Lavan court has made clear that all 
persons in the Ninth Circuit, regardless of circumstance, are afforded 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 
 
 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“[P]oor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can’t afford all the 
gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it.”). 
 72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 
351 (majority opinion)). 
